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Probability of Low-Altitude Midair Collision Between
General Aviation and Unmanned Aircraft
Anders la Cour-Harbo ∗ and Henrik Schiøler
Unmanned aircrafts (UA) usually fly below 500 ft to be segregated from manned aircraft.
However, while general aviation (GA) usually do fly above 500 ft in areas where UA are
allowed to operate, GA will at times also fly below 500 ft. Consequently, there is a distinct
risk of near-miss encounters as well as actual midair collisions (MACs). This work presents a
model for determining this risk based on physical parameters of the aircraft and actual figures
for the numbers of GA in a given airspace, as well as the probability of having GA below 500
ft. The aim is to achieve a prediction with a precision better than one order of magnitude
relative to the true MAC rate value. The model is applied to Danish airspace and the MAC
rate for unmitigated operations of UA is found to be approximately 10−6 MAC per flight
hour. The model is particularly well suited for beyond visual line-of-sight operations, and is
useful for UA operators for conducting risk assessment of planned operations as well as for
regulators for determining appropriate operational requirements.
KEY WORDS: Midair collision; modeling; safety; unmanned aircraft
1. INTRODUCTION
The operations of light commercial unmanned
aircraft (UA) are becoming more ubiquitous, as
the various technologies necessary for operating
longer, safer, and more accuratly are maturing. As
the number of UA increases in the airspace, the
probability of midair collisions (MACs) between
UA and other airspace users also increases. This
work addresses the need for quantifying the risk
that UA operating beyond the visual range of the
operator pose to airspace users that may occasionally
or often operate at very low altitude. This is done
by providing a model that predicts the probability
of MAC for such scenarios. This model can be
used by operators, manufacturers, and authorities
for planning flight operations, for conducting risk
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assessment, for development of guidance material,
and for aviation regulation. This work was in part
prompted by the Danish Transport, Housing, and
Construction Authority (DTCHA) in an effort to de-
termine risk of MAC for beyond visual line-of-sight
(BVLOS) operations in Danish airspace.
1.1. Background
As the number of UA in most national airspaces
is growing rapidly, especially for amateur users, it
has become evident through an increasing number
of reports of near-misses that collisions between
UA and commercial aircraft are likely to occur,
and the consequences could be catastrophic (FAA
Center for Excellence for UAS Research, 2017a,
2017b). However, virtually all such cases are illegal
operations where the UA have entered into con-
trolled airspace, typically close to flight routes for
commercial aviation. This type of flight operation is
beyond the scope of this work.
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But UA also pose a danger to general aviation
(GA) operating in class G airspace below 500 ft
where UA are indeed allowed to operate. As such,
there is a distinct risk of MACs simply due to the fact
that UA and GA (to some extent) share the airspace.
Most GA operate solely according to visual flight
rules (VFR) where the primary method for maintain-
ing separation between airspace users is visual nav-
igation. When operating BVLOS, UA are generally
not able to comply with this method, and technolo-
gies that allow UA to reliably detect GA (such as
radar, LIDAR, cameras) are still both quite expen-
sive and somewhat immature. For this reason, it is
valuable to estimate in a quantitative way the actual
probability of MAC. This estimation will allow au-
thorities, aircraft manufactures, and operators to as-
sess the risk, and plan and execute flights accordingly.
1.2. Previous Work
The vast majority of previous work in MAC
modeling is associated with manned aviation, in par-
ticular with scenarios where aircraft are in controlled
airspace following directions from either ATC (air
traffic control) or following predetermined flight
patterns. This is reviewed in Section 1.2.1. The main
aim for such models is how to maintain sufficient
separation between aircraft without being overly
conservative and thus waste precious airspace. The
literature on GA MAC modeling is somewhat more
limited, and tends to focus on risk associated with
pilots not being sufficiently observant during flight.
There is rather little literature related to modeling of
UA colliding with GA. Some sources are reviewed
in Section 1.2.2.
1.2.1. Manned Aircraft Collision Modeling
Different models for determining the probabil-
ity of aircraft actually colliding during flight have
emerged over the years. Many date back to the 1960s
and 1970s where the rise in air traffic over some
parts of the globe made it necessary to thoroughly
consider how to avoid MAC, and as part of this
process, how to determine the likelihood of MAC.
These models focus on aircraft following predefined
air corridors, such as cross-Atlantic flights. Some of
the first to consider collision risk for such operations
were Marks (1963) and Reich (1966), presenting
a model for the probability of MAC for aircraft
following a predetermined route. The Reich–Marks
model was based on the assumption that there are
random deviations of aircraft positions and speeds
from those expected. Another early example is Ma-
chol (1975), which examines the collision risk over
the North Atlantic for increasing commercial airline
traffic when using designated flight rules for lateral
and vertical separation. The work proposes a model
specific for the risk associated with this type of flight.
One of the most comprehensive models for MAC
is Endoh (1982), which derives a first principle’s
model for collisions based on aircraft density, speed,
and aircraft size. The result is a stochastic model for
predicting MAC rate for airspace with known pa-
rameters for traffic. A model for vertical separation
of manned commercial aircraft in U.S. airspace is
presented in Richie (1989). It accounts for planned
movements using flight plans and tracking data. The
aim is to find the frequency of pairs of aircraft flying
at above FL290 being near each other; near being
defined as less than 1,000 ft vertical separation. A
stochastic model is presented in Datta and Oliver
(1991) for MAC between both commercial and GA
as a function of the type of control airspace in which
they are operating as well as aircraft velocities, ge-
ometries of approach patterns, and aircraft density.
The work concludes that by far the most risky flight
appears to be GA interacting with other GA in posi-
tively controlled environments. In Brooker (2003), a
model is presented based on the Reich model, where
some of the (claimed) shortcomings of that model
are addressed. This is done by taking an event-based
approach, where the parameters directly reflect phys-
ical properties of the aircraft flight. In Blom, Bakker,
Everdij, and van der Park (2003), human factors and
technical factors are included in modeling, which is
stochastic in nature. The purpose is to conduct an
assessment that takes ATM into account rather than
focusing narrowly on aircraft nonnominal behavior,
as most other models do. MAC risk in high-density
airspace is investigated in Montanari, Baldoni, Mor-
ciano, Rizzuto, and Matarese (2012), which presents
a model using cylindrical approximations of the air-
craft. This is a purely geometrical model that works
in three-dimensions (3D) by means of projections.
As such, this model can handle altitude changes of
aircraft. The work also provides an example taken
from airspace at Maastricht. In Fujita (2013), an
expansion of the Rice model includes more detailed
flight trajectories and time-dependent position
errors. It also includes aircraft kinematics and wind.
A description of the development of collision
risk models for commercial aviation from the 1960s
to 1995 is given in Machol (1995), and it details how
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they have been applied to safe separation standards
for various geographical areas around the globe
over a period of 30 years. The focus is on models
for commercial air traffic. A recent review of MAC
models for commercial aviation is Netjasov and
Janic (2008), which includes descriptions of the
general principle for many of the employed models.
A very comprehensive review of 33 different ground
risk models is given in Washington, Clothier, and
Silva (2017). The review categorizes the models into
failure, impact, recovery, stress, exposure, incident
stress, and harm models, and compares them on a
number of parameters.
Although there is plenty of literature on the risk
and mitigation of MACs involving GA, there is less
literature on the modeling of probabilities of MAC
involving GA. The main focus in the GA-related
literature is on VFR and how that particular method
of risk mitigation relates to collision avoidance. As
an example, Koglbauer (2015) describes a training
method for enhancing pilots’ ability to avoid MAC
during VFR flight, and Alexander (1970) looks at
the probability of MAC under VFR and models the
risk as a function of aircraft density in relation to
land area.
1.2.2. UA MAC
A data-driven approach is presented in Mc-
Fadyen and Martin (2016a, 2016b), where flight data
from manned aviation are used to determine optimal
exclusion zones for UA. This method focuses on
low-altitude high-density airspace, and uses the data
to generate polygonal zones dividing the airspace
into density categories. Maki, Weinert, and Kochen-
derfer (2010) present a similar approach that uses
recorded surveillance data and intended flight paths
to estimate the probability of collisions. Both Weibel,
Edwards, and Fernandes (2011) and Adaska (2012)
present a model based on prediction of future
“intruder” trajectories through a stochastic process.
The former proposes a boundary in both time and
distance for well clear separation in compliance with
a rigorous safety assessment. The latter develops the
algorithmic tools for computing the risks of the for-
mer by expanding techniques developed in the target
tracking community. Melnyk, Schrage, Volovoi, and
Jimenez (2014) propose a framework to develop
effectiveness requirements for any sense-and-avoid
(SAA) system by linking UAS characteristics and
operating environments to MAC risk quantified by
means of a fatality rate. The framework is based
on a target level of safety approach using an event
tree format. The framework of Jamoom, Joerger,
Khanafseh, and Pervan (2015) is also based on SAA
capabilities for an aircraft facing an intruder. This
is done by defining integrity risk and continuity
risk as UAS SAA safety performance metrics. The
article provides methods to evaluate these risks
along with requirements to ensure a predefined level
of safety. The article also maps and bounds the trade
space of requirements necessary to maintain desired
integrity and continuity. Alfredson, Hagström, and
Sundqvist (2015) present a study (a part of the
European MIDCAS project) on operations of UA in
controlled airspace, where the UA is equipped with
detect and avoid functionality. The focus is on situ-
ation awareness, and the article reports the lessons
learned from three human-in-the-loop simulation
campaigns. A stochastic Monte Carlo model is used
in Patlovany (1997) to compare the relative MAC
course probabilities and mean closing velocities. The
article claims that regulations in the United States in
1997 can be shown to increase probability of MAC.
This work is not for UA, but is applicable due to its
generic nature. A simple model based on movements
of particles is given in a thesis (Awad, 2013), which
also provides some statistics on MAC between
manned aircraft. The thesis presents first-order
models adapted from the literature that estimate
the MAC risk, and model verification is achieved
through extensive analysis of historic civil aviation
accidents. The two conclusions are that (1) UAS
already achieve manned levels of safety with respect
to MACs because GA aircraft routinely operate in
conditions where see-and-avoid is used but is not
effective, and (2) the risk due to ground collision of
UAS is sufficiently small to allow operations over the
majority of the United States. Finally, two survey pa-
pers (Chand, Mahalakshmi, and Naidu, 2017; Mahjri,
Dhraief, and Belghith, 2015) provide an overview
of collision avoidance systems. The former gives a
brief review of the components of SAA, while the
latter is a somewhat more comprehensive tutorial
that outlines and reviews the substantial breadth of
SAA architectures, technologies, and algorithms.
1.3. Current Work
The focus in this work is to develop a model
that can predict the probability of a MAC between
a UA and any form of GA in class G airspace with
relatively good accuracy. The model is contingent on
the GA operating “randomly,” that is not following
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specific flight routes or patterns, or that such patterns
are unknown at the time of modeling.
A quite thorough first principle approach similar
to the one used in this work was derived in Endoh
(1982), albeit using a slightly different method for
derivation, as well as deriving more detailed varia-
tions of the model. That work did not address any
particular composition of the airspace users, such as
this work does. In addition, the model structure in
this work is designed to accommodate information
that (at least in theory) should be relatively simple to
obtain, and it allows for varying degrees of specificity
depending on the level of detail of the information
about the UA and the GA.
Unlike most existing models, the method pro-
posed in this work is particularly well suited for
BVLOS operations where the UA operator is not
able to visually segregate the UA from any GA, and
where no other effective means of detect and avoid
are in place. Also unlike most other works, we do
use the model to compute MAC rates for a specific
airspace (mainland Denmark) to both demonstrate
the use of the model and to show the estimated
MAC rates for various types of GA.
The aim of this work is to achieve an estimated
MAC rate that can reliably be expected to be no
more than one order of magnitude from the true
MAC rate. This aim is partly based on the expected
quality of the data and partly on the identified model
errors that follow from the simplifying assumptions
listed below. In addition, manned aviation safety
typically operates with orders of magnitude classifi-
cation of levels of safety and levels of hazard, lending
credence to our aim.
2. MAC MODEL
The model presented in this work is developed
for GA such as small fixed-wing planes, such as
the Cessna 172 and Piper Cub; for small rotorcraft,
such as the Robinson 22; for gliders, ultralights,
hang gliders, balloons, etc., that could occasionally
operate below 500 ft, and thus appear in the airspace
where light commercial UA almost always operate.
The model is probabilistic and is set up to accom-
modate parameters that can reasonably be expected
to be available from national aviation authorities, or
other similar sources of data.
The model structure and parameters are pre-
sented first in Section 2.1, followed by a detailed
mathematical derivation of the model components
in Section 2.2. The expansion of the model to in-
clude several different types of GA is explained in
Section 2.3. Finally, in Section 2.4 we discuss the
potential modeling error that the model assumptions
may generate.
2.1. Model Components
The model is probabilistic in nature and relies
on a number of parameters, some deterministic and
some probabilistic. It is solely for determining the
probability of collision between a UA and a GA. It
does not include collateral damage on the ground
from falling debris and the like. The basic concept
of the model is presented in Section 2.1.1, followed
by a description of the structure of the model in
Section 2.1.2. In Section 2.1.3, descriptions of all
required parameters are given.
2.1.1. Modeling Concept
The initial model setup is for a single UA and
a single GA. Later, the model will be expanded
to include multiple GA. The UA and the GA are
represented by vertical cylinders approximating the
physical extends of the two aircraft. The radius and
height of the cylinders can either equal the width
and height of the aircraft, or be safety zones for
modeling near-miss events. The model describes the
probability that the “UA cylinder” will intersect the
“GA cylinder.” Examples of cylinders are depicted
in Fig. 1. The following additional assumptions also
apply to the model.
1. The UA and the GA fly independently.
2. The UA fly below an upper altitude threshold.
3. The probability of the GA being below this up-
per altitude threshold is known (or estimated).
4. Flight directions for both aircraft are uni-
formly distributed from 0º to 360º.
5. Geographical positions of both aircraft are
uniformly distributed across a predefined area.
6. Both aircraft fly only horizontally (no vertical
movement) when close to each other.
7. Altitude of both aircraft is modeled prob-
abilistically with predefined probability
distributions.
8. GA is mostly not below 500 ft in any
area where UA can legally operate. See
Section 2.2.4 for details.
As a consequence of assumptions 4 and 5, the
model is suited only for airspace where no external
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Fig. 1. Two cylinders showing the modeled physical extend of the UA and the GA. The red cylinder is a UA flying in one horizontal
direction, and the blue cylinder is a GA flying in another horizontal direction. A collision is defined as the two cylinders intersecting in
space.
control is imposed to guide aircraft into certain
patterns, typically class G airspace. Also, as a conse-
quence of assumptions 6 and 7, collisions caused by
sudden altitude change (i.e., altitude change during
the time the two aircraft cylinders are overlapping
horizontally) are not modeled. However, since the
vertical speed typically is somewhat less than the
horizontal speed, and since the vertically traversed
distance for a GA is significantly smaller than the
horizontally traversed distance, this assumption
has only negligible effect for all types of GA but
parachutes and balloons in descent or ascent. This is
detailed in Section 2.4
The model supports fairly general assumptions
on the type of GA (by averaging over typical size,
speed, etc., for the entire population of GA), as
well as more specific assumptions where data are
available for individual types of GA. The latter is the
approach taken in Section 3.
2.1.2. Model Structure
The model for MAC is composed of four main
probabilistic parts appearing in product form as:
pMAC = pHC · pVC · pbelow · λSTM. (1)
The first term pHC is the rate of “horizontal colli-
sion.” That is, the rate by which the two aircraft will
be at the same two-dimensional geographical loca-
tion to allow a collision to occur. This rate is based
on assigned circles around both aircraft (and a hor-
izontal collision is defined as those two circles over-
lapping), and the assumption that both aircraft have
known horizontal speeds.
The second term pVC is the conditional probabil-
ity of “vertical collision” given GA is below thresh-
old. That is, the probability that the two aircraft are
at the same vertical location (same altitude) and with
zero vertical speed. This probability is based on con-
ditional probability density functions for the altitude
of both aircraft, as well as the height of both aircraft.
The third term pbelow is the probability that the
GA is below an altitude threshold, which in this work
represents the maximum altitude at which UA would
legally operate. How to determine an appropriate
altitude is discussed later in Section 2.2.4.
The fourth and last term λSTM is the effect of
strategic and tactical mitigations. The three previous
factors assume complete randomness in the air-
craft motions (subject to the assumptions described
above), and thus do not capture any mitigating means
that could be introduced to reduce collision proba-
bility. However, for some flight scenarios there will
be some form of strategic mitigations (i.e., mitigative
means introduced before any flights and applying to
all UA or GA) and/or tactical mitigation (i.e., mitiga-
tive means in effect during flight), and λSTM captures
the effect of such mitigations. Examples of strategic
mitigation are temporal and spatial constraints, and
examples of tactical mitigation are detect and avoid
sensors and transponders as well as visual observa-
tions by the GA operator. In this work, λSTM ex-
presses how much the combined strategic and tactical
mitigations will reduce the probability of collision. It
is important to note that λSTM as implemented in this
model is only valid for relatively modest mitigations;
it does not represent well relatively effective means
such as operations in controlled or closed airspace.
These four products are largely independent;
pHC and pVC are the probabilities of the GA and UA
being at the same physical location in an North-East-
Down coordinate system, where pHC is the proba-
bility that the North–East coordinates sets for the
GA and UA are equal (or sufficiently close for the
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cylinders to intersect) and pVC is the probability
that the Down coordinates are equal. Since the
motions (and thus locations) of the UA and GA are
independent, so too pHC and pHC. The probability
pbelow is solely a property of the GA, and expresses
the likelihood of the GA being in the same air
volume as the UA, making it independent from pHC
and pVC. Finally, the last term λSTM may have minor
dependency on both pHC and pVC if, for instance,
the flight altitude for the UA is chosen such as to
mitigate the risk of colliding with known, say, glider,
operations nearby. However, for most mitigations,
such as transponders and SAA, there is rather little
dependence on the altitude and/or geographical
position of the GA.
2.1.3. Model Parameters
Assume a given geographical area where the
number and flight time of various GA are available,
typically a nation. This area has size G. The number
of GA available in this area is denoted as n. A
GA has a given fraction of time airborne T (often
provided as flight hours per year, which we denote as
Tyear). It flies at an average speed vGA, and the GA
cylinder has a vertical extend hGA and horizontal
radius of rGA. The UA similarly has values vUA,
hUA, and rGA. The maximum altitude that we will
consider is called zmax. This can be 500 ft, but it can
also be lower depending on the regional or national
limit for UA operations. We assume SI units for
all parameters.
2.2. Collision Model
The following derivation is for a single UA
flying in an airspace with a single GA. It is composed
of a horizontal component and a vertical compo-
nent. The horizontal component is presented in
Section 2.2.1, and the vertical component is pre-
sented in Section 2.2.3. Section 2.2.2 addresses how
to exclude UA no-fly zones such as airports. The
altitude distributions of GA and UA are discussed in
Sections 2.2.4 and 2.2.5, respectively. The risk mitiga-
tion factor λSTM is briefly discussed in Section 2.2.6.
2.2.1. Horizontal Collision Model
First, the average area covered by the cylinders
(i.e., the disc resulting from the projection of the
d x
rGArUA
vUA
vGA
θGAθUA
Fig. 2. The figure shows the relative locations of aircraft cylinders
as seen from above at the time of initial intersection. The thick ar-
rows show the flight velocities of each aircraft. The red line shows
the trace of the UA relative to the GA.
cylinders onto the horizontal plane) of one GA and
one UA at any given time is:
G′ = π(r2GA + r2UA)T,
and the fraction of the geographical area covered by
the cylinders is G′/G. The cylinders move over time
as the GA and UA travel through the airspace, and
the average time period the GA and UA cylinders
intersect horizontally is:
ti = 2〈d〉〈v〉 , (2)
where d is half the travel distance for the GA dur-
ing safety zones intersection and v is the relative
speed between the GA and the UA. See Fig. 2 for a
visualization.
Now,
d(x) =
√
r2 − x2,
where r = rGA + rUA, and x is the distance between
the center of the GA cylinder and the line that the
center of the UA cylinder travels as perceived by
the GA. We assume that x is uniformly distributed
in the interval [0; r ]. The average value of d then
becomes:
〈d〉 = 1
r
∫ r
0
d(x)dx
= 1
r
[
1
2
x
√
r2 − x2 + 1
2
r2 arcsin
x
r
]r
0
= rπ
4
.
As v is the relative speed between the UA and GA,
it is the norm of the difference of the two velocity
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vectors for the two aircraft:
v = ‖vUA − vGA‖
=
√
v2GA + v2UA − 2vGAvUA cos(θUA − θGA), (3)
where vGA and vUA are the norms, and θGA and
θUA the angles (relative to a global frame) of vx and
vGA, respectively. Assuming that both θGA and θUA
are uniformly distributed on [0; 2π ], the PDF for
θ = θUA − θGA is:
f (θ) =
{ 2π−|θ |
4π2 |θ | < 2π
0 otherwise.
The average value of cos θ in Equation (3) is then:
〈cos θ〉 =
∫ 2π
−2π
cos θ f (θ)dθ = 0,
and consequently,
〈v〉 =
√
v2GA + v2UA.
Inserting into Equation (2):
ti = (rGA + rUA)π
2
√
v2GA + v2UA
.
Let to be the average time the cylinders are not
intersecting horizontally. Then the probability of
intersection can be expressed as:
pi = G
′
G
= ti
ti + to , (4)
and cylinder intersection rate is then:
pHC(rGA, rUA, vGA, vUA, T) = 1ti + to =
pi
ti
= π(r
2
GA + r2UA)T
(rGA + rUA)π
2
√
v2GA+ v2UA
G
=
2(r2GA + r2UA)T
√
v2GA + v2UA
(rGA + rUA)G .
(5)
The unit for pHC in this formulation is hertz. Note
that this can be simplified by the assumptions rGA 	
rUA and vGA 	 vUA, resulting in:
pHC ≈ 2rGATvGAG . (6)
We do not use this simplification in this work.
2.2.2. Note on Area G
The geographical area G as defined above is
typically a state or nation because states and nations
have well-known areas, and databases for GA typ-
ically cover specifically states or nations. However,
it means that a certain fraction of G inevitably are
areas where UA cannot legally operate (airports,
security areas, etc.), and consequently Equation
(5) will underestimate the probability of horizontal
collision. Using in Equation (5) a smaller area
G∗ ⊂ G, representing the UA legally accessible
area of G, would not remedy the problem as the
yearly operational time T covers all flight of the GA,
including flight outside G∗. However, under the (un-
substantiated, but arguably reasonable) assumption
that the fraction G∗/G approximately equals T∗/T,
where T∗ is the flight time spent in G∗, Equation (5)
still is a good approximation of horizontal impact
probability, in particular because both G∗/G and
T∗/T are close to 1.
2.2.3. Vertical Collision Model
Under the assumption that the UA cylinder and
the GA cylinder are at the same geographical loca-
tion, we will now determine the probability that the
cylinders intersect in the vertical direction. The verti-
cal location (altitude) of both aircraft is at the vertical
middle of the respective cylinders. Thus, there is a
collision if the difference in altitude between the two
aircraft is less than the sum of the cylinder heights.
The altitude of each aircraft is described by
a probability density function, called fGA(z) and
fUA(z) for the GA and UA, respectively. These
are chosen so as to reflect how the aircraft actually
behave in terms of altitude (see Sections 2.2.4
and 2.2.5). The probability that the GA and the
UA are sufficiently close together in altitude for the
cylinders to intersect is given by the joint distribu-
tion integrated over the joint space where the two
altitude parameters are closer than half the sum of
the aircraft heights. That is,
pVC( fGA, hGA, hUA)
=
∫∫
|α−β|≤hGA+hUA
β<zmax
fGA(α) fUA(β)d(α, β)dβdα
=
∫ zmax
0
fUA(β)
(
FGA
(
β + hGA + hUA
2
)
−FGA
(
β − hGA + hUA
2
))
dβ, (7)
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where FGA is the cumulative distribution function as-
sociated with fGA. The basis for choosing a particular
fGA and fUA is discussed in Sections 3.1.3 and 3.1.4.
The vertical collision model (Equation (7)) does
not handle the limits very well, in the sense that the
model implicitly uses the vertical centers of both
cylinders as reference. Thus, in this model at very
low altitude and at altitude close to zmax the aircraft
extend outside [0; zmax], which is not captured by
Equation (7). So, if the cylinder heights are relatively
large compared to zmax, then pVC is underestimating
the intersection probability. However, for normal
cases where the height of the aircraft is small relative
to zmax, this is a negligible issue.
2.2.4. Probability of GA Below zmax
In most countries, some geographical areas are
designated as non-UA areas (airports, aerodromes,
helipads, nature sensitive areas, military areas, areas
around certain buildings and installations, etc.). By
definition, the complement to the set of these areas
is the areas where UA can indeed fly. The model
implementation has the assumption (as stated in
Section 2.1.1) that GA is mostly not below zmax
in any area where UA can legally operate. This is
derived from the assumption that GA is generally
required to stay above 500 ft, with only (some of) the
areas listed above as exceptions. The model is also
based on the assumption that in most cases when
GA is indeed below zmax in rural or urban areas, it
is not a normal operational situation (with balloons
being an exception). Knowing approximately how
often such abnormal operations occur allows for an
estimate of how often GA is indeed below zmax. As
described above, the model (1) therefore includes
the factor pbelow that expresses the likelihood of a
GA being below zmax (which does not have to be
500 ft, but should not exceed 500 ft). Estimated
values for Denmark are shown and discussed in
Section 3.1.
In addition, for GA flying below zmax we assume
some altitude distribution fGA for the purpose of
determining probability of a vertical collision, as
described in Section 2.2.3. In most cases, a uniform
distribution between 0 and zmax is appropriate; as an
example, a glider conducting an offsite landing will
typically be on final approach when below 500 ft, and
thus descend constantly until landing. Note that the
probability density function for this distribution only
covers the range from 0 to zmax. This is because we
assume for the vertical collision model that the GA
is indeed below zmax.
2.2.5. UA Altitude Distribution
The UA will also be assumed to follow an
altitude distribution fUA, which will depend on
the mission flown. For long endurance missions
for monitoring or transport, a normal distribution
around the expected flight altitude seems reasonable,
while for, say, a photographic mission for real estate
or a sport events, a uniform distribution between
10 m and 50 m may be appropriate. Any distribu-
tion used should integrate to 1 over the interval 0
to zmax.
2.2.6. Strategic and Tactical Mitigations
The model in Equation (1) includes the factor
λSTM, which is simply multiplied with the unmiti-
gated probability of a MAC. The purpose is to allow
a reduction of the MAC probability in case there are
mitigations in place. Such measures may differ for
individual UA and GA. This work does not address
this in any detail, and the factor is primarily included
to allow for relatively simple mitigative measures.
2.3. Multi-GA Model
The MAC rate modeled in Equation (1) is valid
for one GA. To account for multiple GA, we simply
multiply the probability pHC by the number n of
similar type GA. Here, we assume that none of the
airborne GA will have overlapping cylinders. The
multiplication is a good approximation of the joint
probability for many GA since the cylinders are
quite small relative to G.
To have a model that captures jointly all GA in
the airspace (ranging from fixed wing to balloons),
we want to determine the four right-hand side
factors in Equation (1) for each type of GA. The
parameters vGA, rGA, hGA, and fGA will be different
for different types of GA, and must be inserted in
Equations (5) and (7) for each type. In addition, the
probability pbelow and the distribution fGA will vary
with different GAs, and so will the mitigation factor
λSTM. These parameters must be quantified (either
through measurements, estimations, or educated
guessing) before the model is practically useful. Our
approach to this is described in Section 3.1.1.
A good approximation of the joint probability
for a MAC is a weighted summation of pMAC from
the model (1) for each type of GA. This does omit
the fact that should a MAC occur between the UA
and one type of GA, the probability of the UA
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colliding with another GA becomes zero. However,
the approximation is quite good due to the overall
low value for each pMAC.
The final model becomes:
pMAC ≈
# of GA types∑
i=1
pHC(rGA,i , rUA, vGA,i , vUA)
·pVC( fGA,i , hGA,i , hUA) · ni · pbelow,i · λSTM,i (8)
where the sum runs over the different types of GA
included in the model. Note that Equation (8) is
the MAC rate for one UA operating in an airspace
together with all GAs included in the model.
2.4. Model Error Assessment
The quantitative framework developed above
for collision rate assessment is model based, and
a number of simplifying assumptions were made
for mathematical tractability. This of course intro-
duces model errors, which manifest themselves into
quantitative errors in the final result pMAC. From
an overall perspective, event rates and probabilities
appearing in risk analysis will often be of small
magnitude, whereas the accuracy by which they are
given is logarithmic. That is, if results predict the
correct order of magnitude, they will most likely be
acceptable. This aligns with the aim of this work,
as stated in Section 1.3. Therefore, additive errors
should be orders of magnitude lower than the results
themselves, whereas multiplicative errors should be
logarithmically low.
One significant simplification is the disregard
of vertical flight speeds in the expression for ti in
Equation (2). To assess the model error, consider
a simplistic 3D model, where collision cylinders are
replaced by 3D ellipsoids to allow for much simpler
definition of collision. That is, a collision ellipsoid is
defined as:
x2 + y2 + (4z)2 = r2, (9)
where the factor 4 reflects a vehicle height four times
less than width and length. The escape time Ti from
the ellipsoidal center of a vehicle with a speed vector
(Vx, Vy, Vz) is found by:
(VxTi )2 + (VyTi )2 + (4VzTi )2 = r2,
which gives
Ti = r√
V2x + V2y + (4Vz)2.
The difference in escape time compared to Vz = 0 is
given by:
r√
V2x + V2y + (4Vz)2
r√
V2x + V2y
= V
2
x + V2y + 16V2z
V2x + V2y
= 1 + 16 V
2
z
V2x + V2y
.
So, assuming V2z to be at least 100 times smaller than
V2x + V2y , we find Vz accounts for at most 16% of the
result. In addition, assuming that Vz is only nonneg-
ligible for a limited part of a normal flight, say 10%
of the time, this further reduces the average error by
that same factor. We get from Equation (4) that
to = ti 1 − pipi , (10)
so that pHC(rGA, rUA, vGA, vUA, T) in Equation (5) is
similarly affected at most 1.6% (i.e., 10% of 16%) by
neglecting a vertical velocity that is 10 times smaller
than horizontal velocity.
Another simplification is the abstraction of
GA and UA hull geometries to vertical cylinders.
Obviously, two cylinders may intersect without
a collision occurring, even if the cylinders are of
minimal volume to contain the GA or UA. Thus, the
probability of collision given cylinder intersection
PCI is less than 1, which directly affects the final
result as a multiplicative error. However, PCI is still
relatively close to 1, since most GA as well as UA
will appear as a predominantly filled rectangle (i.e.,
the projection of the cylinder) in the flight direction.
Thus, PCI and therefore the result is skewed much
less than an order of magnitude (the aim of this
work; see Section 1.3). Note that this error is reliably
overestimating the probability of collision.
3. RESULTS
The predictive capabilities of the model are
demonstrated using two common UA and a generic
aircraft. The target region is Denmark, as the author
has access to detailed data for Danish airspace.
Similar results can be generated for other airspace as
long as sufficient airspace data are available.
3.1. Model Parameter Values
To apply the model, a series of parameters are
required. In the following, first the aircraft param-
eters are given in Section 3.1.1, and parameters for
mitigation are given in Section 3.1.2. The distribu-
tions used for GA and UA are given in Sections 3.1.3
and 3.1.4, respectively.
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Table II. Parameters for Three UA
Parameter Generic M600 Penguin C
vUA 18 m/s 6 m/s 21 m/s
rUA 0.8 m 0.5 m 1.7 m
hUA 0.3 m 0.6 m 0.8 m
fUA U(0, 100) N(25, 20) N(90, 5)
Mitigation n/a Time restriction DAA
3.1.1. Aircraft Parameters
We will use nine different types of GA listed in
Table I.
These types are provided by the DTCHA from
its database of GA registered in Denmark, and the
values for n are extracted from the same database.
The parameters vGA, rGA, and hGA are taken from
typical GA in each category. The values T and
pbelow are estimates provided by Klavs Andersen
and Anders Madsen from DTCHA. They are both
aviation inspectors for UA and have extensive
past experience from manned GA. There has been
no additional review process or verification of
the validity of their estimates. The authors have
attempted to obtain independent figures for these
two parameters from two other European national
civil aviation authorities, but have faced significant
reluctance to provide any estimates of this kind.
This may be understandable given the ramifications
erroneous estimates may have for aviation safety.
The authors have also attempted to find historical
statistics for these parameters, but these quantities
do not seem to be recorded (in an accessible form)
in available flight incident statistics. As described
in Section 2.2.4, the probability values for pbelow in
Table I are applicable only outside restricted areas,
such as airports, aerodromes, and helipads.
Since the maximum altitude in Denmark for
flights outside urban areas is 100 m, we set zmax =
100.
Three different types of UA are used; a generic
smaller fixed-wing aircraft, the DJI Matrice 600
multirotor, and the larger fixed-wing UAV Factory
Penguin C. The parameters for the aircraft are
shown in Table II.
3.1.2. Mitigation
The values from mitigation are shown in
Table III. There is no mitigation for the generic air-
craft. The M600 flight uses time restrictions to avoid
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Table III. Estimated Strategic/Tactical Mitigations for Three UA
Strategic/Tactical Mitigation
Generic M600 Penguin
Fixed wing <5,700 kg 1 1 0.5
Rotorcraft 1 1 0.5
Glider 1 1 0.5
Motor glider 1 1 0.5
Ultralight 1 0.2 1
Paraglider 1 0.2 1
Hang glider 1 0.2 1
Parachute 1 0.2 1
Balloon 1 0.1 0.2
operating when conditions are right for balloons
(during morning and afternoon hours), as well as
knowledge that there is no paraglider, hang glider, or
parachutes activity in the area. The Penguin C uses
a radar-based detect and avoid system that enables
it to detect and avoid aircraft with a reasonable
effectiveness. A mitigation factor of 1 will mean that
no mitigation is in place. Do note that all the used
<1 mitigative values are at present pure speculation
and only serve to demonstrate the capabilities of the
presented model.
3.1.3. GA Altitude Distributions
The GA distributions show how each GA type
is distributed in altitude when below 100 m. This
information is quite difficult to determine accurately,
and in this work is based purely on considerations on
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Fig. 4. The probability of each type of aircraft being below zmax
is shown in red (taken directly from Table I). The blue, green,
and magenta dots show the probability of vertical collision pVC
as given by Equation (7) using the parameters given in Table I.
how each type of GA could be expected to behave
below 100 m. Three different distributions are used,
a uniform between 0 m and 100 m, and two normal
distributions, one with mean 100 m and one with
mean 50 m. The used GA distributions are shown in
Fig. 3. Both normal distributions are in fact cropped
Fig. 3. Left: The three PDFs used for the GAs listed in Table I. Right: The three PDFs used for the three UA scenarios. All are restricted
to 0–100 m and capped as described in the text.
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Fig. 5. The green dots show the rates derived from the horizontal collision probability model (5). The black squares show the output of the
MAC model in Equation (1) when multiplied with n, the number of each aircraft as listed in Table I, thus being the MAC rate. The solid
black horizontal line shows the sum of the nine aircraft as given by Equation (8). For reference, the blue dashed line shows 10−7 MAC per
flight hour.
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to the interval 0–100 m and scale to integrate to 1
over this interval.
Each GA type is assigned one of these distribu-
tions, as shown in Table I. Fixed wing, glider, and
motor glide will typically be conducting a landing
when at this low altitude, and their descent is as-
sumed to be fairly constant. Therefore, a uniform
altitude distribution is assigned. Parachutes also
descent with a fairly constant rate, and are thus also
assigned a uniform distribution.
Rotorcraft can occasionally conduct operations
at lower altitude, but tend to stay some distance
over the ground. The same goes for balloons, which
tend to be some distance from the ground when
below 100 m. Ultralights are powered and would
typically also not fly low during most of the flight.
All these GA are therefore assigned a normal
distribution that puts them predominantly at the
higher altitudes.
Paragliders and hang gliders are unpowered
and are expected to operate around 50 m during
the ascent and landing. As such, they are assigned a
normal distribution around 50 m.
Do note that these distributions are speculative
insofar as no research, to the best knowledge of the
authors, has been done to actually determine such
altitude distributions.
3.1.4. UA Altitude Distributions
The altitude profile for operations of UA is ob-
viously varying with the type of mission, and can be
anything from flying at very low altitudes for action
photography over changing altitudes for inspection
to long endurance operations at maximum altitude
for surveying. We will use three different profiles
here:
1. Uniform distribution from 0 to maximum
altitude, exemplified with a generic aircraft
conducting flight operations at varying alti-
tudes, and modeled with uniform distribution
U(0,zmax = 100).
2. Low flight operations where the probability
is decreasing with altitude, exemplified with a
Matrice 600 conducting last-mile package de-
livery, and modeled with N(25, 20), that is, a
normal distribution with mean 25 m and stan-
dard deviation 20 m.
3. Near-maximum altitude long endurance flight
mission, exemplified with a Penguin C aircraft
doing hub-to-hub parcel transport, and mod-
eled with N(90, 5).
Both normal distributions are cropped to
[0; zmax] and scaled to integrated to 1. The three
distributions are shown on the right in Fig. 3.
3.2. MAC Rates
Using the parameters for Danish airspace shown
in Table I and the parameters for the three different
UA in Tables II and III, we can now compute
the MAC rate both for the individual GA types
and jointly.
First, Fig. 4 shows the vertical collision model
output pVC along with the probability of each type
being below zmax. The pVC numbers are shown in a
separate plot since they are relatively high compared
to pHC, and since they are probabilities (as opposed
to rates).
Fig. 5 has a plot for each of the UA. Each
plot shows the computed horizontal collision rates,
along with the MAC rate, for all nine types of GA.
The MAC rate is the output from the model in
Equation (1). In addition, each of the three plots also
show the approximated joint probability for MAC as
computed in Equation (8), with ρi set to 1 and ρi set
according to Table III, respectively. For comparison,
the value 10−7 MAC per flight hour is also shown
in each plot, as this is the order of magnitude that
several sources report as being equivalent to the
level of safety for GA (Dalamagkidis, Valavanis,
and Piegl, 2008; FAA, 2013; Melnyk et al., 2014).
4. CONCLUSION
We have presented a model for predicting
the MAC rates of UA operating at low altitudes
in uncontrolled airspace. The model is targeted
at MAC between one UA and all types of GA,
and is designed specifically for altitudes below
500 ft. The model is conditioned on at least some
knowledge of the GA airspace users (such as speed,
size, and number), which may not necessarily be
easy to obtain for a given airspace. However, this
approach does provide some degree of certainty in
the resulting probabilities in comparison to models
based on stochastic assumptions only. The aim has
been to achieve a precision of at least one order of
magnitude relative to the true MAC rate.
The model is applied to Danish airspace and
gives a generic MAC rate of approximately 10−6
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collision per flight hour (black dashed line in
“Generic” plot in Fig. 5). This relatively high value
may come as a surprise, in particular that it is
mainly a result of potential collisions with balloons.
This also demonstrates that the total MAC rate is
somewhat sensitive to the parameters chosen for
the balloons (mainly the probability of occurrence
below zmax, and the strategic mitigations for avoiding
balloons).
At the same time, the resulting MAC rates
for the Matrice 600 and Penguin C scenarios are
encouraging in the sense that they have the same
order of magnitude as GA in itself, and thus comply
with the concept of equivalent level of safety. In
addition, they also largely comply with various
recommendations in the literature, here specifically
compared to 10−7 MAC per flight hour given by FAA
(2013).
4.1. Reflections on the Model
The primary strengths of the model are (1) the
ability to provide a reasonable estimate of MAC for
any airspace where only standard data held by the
aviation authorities are available, and (2) the applica-
bility to the most common type of airspace that UA
operate in, now as well as in the foreseeable future.
Although the model in Equation (1) is widely
accepted and found in various forms in much of
the existing literature, the derivation of the four
individual terms may be subject to debate. We have
divided the probability of an impact into horizontal
and vertical “impacts,” which makes sense because
the models for these are rather different and because
aircraft generally behave differently horizontally and
vertically. However, both GA and UA obviously
move in 3D space and there is indeed a varying
degree of correlation between the forward, sideways,
and up/down motion for various types of GA and
UA. This is not captured by the presented model.
Also, the model does not capture collision caused
by vertical motion, which is a distinct drawback,
although we argue that for all but parachutes and
balloons in ascent/descent, the modeling error is
acceptable.
The assumption that GA is uniformly distributed
in the relevant air volume is also a weakness of the
model, insofar as UA pilots are aware of this and
adapt their behavior accordingly (such as not operat-
ing at locations where aircraft are regularly observed,
even though it would be legal to do so). However,
while a model that would include such geographically
specific information would not be that complicated
to implement, it would probably be rather difficult
to obtain reliable data for such a model.
4.2. Future Work
The primary effort in future work would be
to address the separation of horizontal and ver-
tical motions, that is, eliminating assumption 6 in
Section 2.1.1. This would primarily be a matter of
expanding the math to handle various types of cylin-
der intersection. It would be good for the precision
to have better data to support pbelow as well as λSTM,
which at this point are estimations only.
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